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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the financial crisis on investment decisions in 
innovative versus non-innovative firms. Firms are defined as being innovative if they 
have introduced a new product to the market. The empirical test is based on data for 
the years before and after the recent financial crisis. Probit estimations show that 
innovative firms are more likely to suffer from the financial crisis and to reduce their 
investment expenditures in general. To some extent these reductions are due to 
problems in the acquisition of external capital. Using difference-in-differences 
methods, it turns out that innovative firms realize the same reduction in growth rates 
in turnover, but a stronger reduction in investment growth than non-innovative firms.   
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I. Introduction 
It is generally acknowledged that innovations are of major importance for the growth of an 
economy. Innovations increase consumer surplus through the introduction of new products, 
improved quality of existing products and price reductions due to process innovations. On the 
microeconomic level firms have incentives to pursue innovative activity to obtain an advantage 
over rivals, enter new markets and to achieve a (temporary) monopoly position.  
At least since the contributions of Schumpeter it is well known that the financing of innovations 
is a complex issue. Obviously innovative activity is risky and the risk increases with the degree of 
novelty to the market. This risk exists due to major uncertainties with respect to the success of 
their R&D process and market acceptance of their product. Moreover a major problem exists with 
respect to asymmetric information between innovator and banks as money lenders. This leads to 
severe difficulties for innovative firms to get access to external financing (Hall 2002). Especially 
those firms which intend to introduce a novelty to the market encounter serious constraints with 
respect to external finance (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011a).  
The financial crisis is often associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Although 
the problems began earlier, this event became the major trigger for the turmoil on the financial 
markets. It is well known that the financial crisis led to serious problems for the banks, many of 
whom lost money so that these resources were no longer available as credit for the private sector. 
Furthermore, regulations concerning equity, improved risk control and improved disclosure 
affected credit management. With some likelihood, the blight suffered by the financial sector was 
also transmitted to the real economy. With a shortage of capital, banks become more selective 
about the financing of projects, and it is quite probable that risky activities like innovation suffer 
as a result.  
The aim of the present study is an analysis of whether investment in innovative firms in particular 
was affected by the consequences of the financial crisis. Innovative activity is by its very nature 
risky, and it may well be that innovative firms in general have greater difficulty accessing 
external finance. However, this difficulty might have been intensified during the financial crisis 
and may then have affected investment, a largely externally financed activity. We investigate 
whether innovative firms report increased obstacles to financing investment from external 
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sources and whether these firms encountered more substantial reductions in investment than non-
innovators.  
In our study innovation is specified by the introduction of a product new to the market.1 In the 
first part of our analysis we use survey data to test on differences between innovative and non-
innovative firms on changes in investment behavior. We analyze whether reductions in 
investment due to the crisis are more likely for innovative firms. Moreover, the survey that we 
use also includes explicit information on whether innovative firms are more likely to reduce their 
investments in the crisis due to a lack of access to external funds. 
The second part of our study considers effects on revenues and investment. The change 
(reduction) in revenues identifies the development of demand and availability of internal means 
during the crisis. Next investment is considered. It is of general interest to investigate how 
investment evolves in times of economic crisis and whether there are differences between 
innovators and non-innovators. What is more, investment is an activity that is largely financed 
externally and it is possible that innovators and non-innovators had different chances to get 
access to external finance during the crisis. Hence we investigate whether revenues and 
investment changed similarly for both firm types, or whether investment growth differs from 
sales growth and between innovators and non-innovators.  
The empirical analysis is based on data from the IAB establishment panel and includes the waves 
2006 to 2010. The IAB establishment panel2 samples about 16,000 firms and covers several 
establishment characteristics and questions related to innovation and investments. The panel 
character allows us to compare changes in outcome, such as investments and revenues, for 
innovative firms with others. 
We contribute to a strand of literature which investigates the impact of the financial crisis on 
innovative firms. Our approach is the combination of two types of test. Firstly, we use 
questionnaire-based assessments of the crisis’ impact on firms3. Among other issues the survey 
that we use inquires about the impact of the crisis, modification of investment plans in 2009, 
                                                            
1 cf. Lee at al. (2015) for a similar procedure. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a) show that financing constraints are 
more binding for innovators introducing a novelty to the market (cutting edge R&D performers) by comparing them 
with firms that either imitate or improve products (routine R&D performers). 
2 The data was collected by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), located in Nuremberg, Germany. 
3 Related research was done by Campello et al. (2010) and Paunov (2012). 
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whether these modifications were the result of the financial crisis and, finally, whether the 
changes in investment were due to problems in accessing external capital. Hence, the survey 
allows us to investigate for the first time in detail the relation between the crisis, the effect on 
investment in general and in particular the impact of problems in accessing external financial 
sources on investment expenditures for innovative firms. Secondly, we employ a difference-in-
differences setting to investigate the impact of the financial crisis on innovative firms with 
respect to revenues and investments. To our knowledge, this is the first study which combines 
both approaches to analyze whether innovators’ investment plans are affected more by the crisis 
than others. 
Our results show that innovative firms more frequently report reduced investments due to the 
financial crisis. Moreover, according to the survey questions innovators were likelier to cut 
investment due to the problem of obtaining external capital. Secondly, aside of the responses to 
qualitative questions in the survey, difference-in-differences estimations with economically 
relevant variables are carried out. The results show that, compared with control observations, 
innovators did not realize less revenue growth. However, according to the difference-in-
differences results, innovative firms realized lower investment growth due to the crisis. Hence, 
these results point to the conclusion that innovative firms have suffered much more from the 
financial crisis than non-innovative firms.  
II. The impact of the crisis on innovative firms’ access to external 
finance and investment 
II.1 Theoretical considerations of the problems of innovative firms to finance R&D 
and investment in conventional assets 
The specific situation related to financing R&D has been a subject of discussion for some time 
now. In principle there are two sources for financing investment in R&D for innovative firms: 
internal or external. Internally generated sources mainly consist of cash flow. External sources on 
the other hand tend to take the form of bank loans or other similar debt-oriented lending 
relationships (David et al. 2000). As pointed out by Myers and Majluf (1984) firms prefer to 
finance their investment activities by internal means. When internal resources are limited, firms 
are interested in external financing before turning to equity as a source of finance.  
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Investment in innovation is different from investment in conventional assets. According to Hall 
(2002) there are three main differences between R&D and other investments. Firstly, expenditure 
for R&D is used to create intangible assets which are the basis for future profits. These assets are 
intangible because a large part of the expenditure goes toward employing highly educated staff 
and is therefore investment in human capital. Therefore, a major part of the investment is sunk. 
Secondly, investment in R&D cannot be used as collateral value as it would be the case with a 
normal investment. Thirdly, obviously there is a high degree of uncertainty connected with 
innovation activities. To be profitable R&D must lead to an innovation and this innovation must 
then be successful at the market. In most cases financing of innovation also implies problems 
arising from asymmetric information. The inventor usually has better information about the 
probability of success of the R&D project and the market value of the innovation. These specific 
circumstances lead to higher interest rates for external funds or to the unavailability of this kind 
of financing at all. 
Aside of leading to problems in financing their R&D expenditures by external sources, 
innovative activity may well have implications for financing other projects like investment. As 
stated earlier, innovation is a risky activity and innovative firms may face higher business risks in 
general. New investment is frequently undertaken to install new process innovation or to generate 
capacities for product innovations. As investment may be a consequence of innovation activity 
such firms may also realize larger problems with financing investment than non-innovators. 
Financial constraints for investment in particular have been a topic of discussion for some time.4 
Investment expenditures are perhaps less risky than expenditures for innovation, as tangible 
assets are created, but they remain risky to some degree. Risk is higher for investment connected 
with new products and processes, and the asymmetric information problem is here also an issue.  
II.2 Empirical Evidence concerning the financing of investment and R&D  
A growing amount of literature on innovation discusses financing constraints for innovative 
firms. With respect to the kind of innovation, there is evidence to suggest that innovative firms 
which introduce novelties to the market face more binding constraints than imitators (Czarnitzki 
and Hottenrott (2011a)). Likewise, Mina et al. (2013) point out that innovative firms might 
encounter greater problems regarding access to external finance.  
                                                            
4 Early theoretical works concerning imperfect information, credit rationing and investments are for example Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) as well as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). 
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In addition to studies which concentrate solely on innovation5 or investments6 there are studies 
which focus on investment in both physical assets and R&D. Hall (1992) finds that liquidity 
matters for investment in both physical assets and R&D, using cash flow as an indicator for the 
availability of internal means. If internal sources have such a large relevance, this is an indicator 
of the existence of financial constraints. Moreover, further evidence exists for innovative firms 
that financing constraints matter for both R&D and ordinary investments (Himmelberg and 
Petersen (1994), Harhoff (1988) and Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011b)). 
II.3 The impact of the financial crisis on lending behavior of banks 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008 marks one of the most important events during the 
recent financial crisis. The crisis impacted on banks firstly if they relied on the interbanking 
market and secondly if they themselves had risky assets in their portfolio that dramatically lost in 
value. Such unfortunate circumstances reduced the banks’ resources for lending. Aside of these 
reasons for increased obstacles to debt financing, during and after the crisis banks implemented a 
stricter risk management. This was induced by external requirements of the Basel II accord, but 
was also the consequence of tightened risk assessment by banks to avoid losses from defaults 
after the lessons learned from the crisis.  
In addition to theoretical investigations7, empirical studies present evidence that lending activities 
were indeed reduced because of the crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010, Puri et al. 2011). 
Besides the impact on the banking sector, the financial crisis had an impact on the demand from 
firms for credit and access to credit. Taking a sample of UK firms, Cowling et al. (2012) present 
evidence that a larger firm size and a decrease in sales are important drivers of higher demand for 
external means. Moreover, they show that small firms suffer more than larger firms from 
impeded access to external capital by banks. With respect to the source of capital of the banks 
themselves, Iyer et al. (2014) show that the breakdown of the interbanking market led to a 
reduction of firm credit by banks which relied heavily on this source to finance lending activities.  
                                                            
5 Bond et al. (2005) for example takes cash flow as one of the most common measures reflecting internal means and 
as an indicator for constraints. A direct way of analyzing the financing constraints of innovative firms using survey 
data on delayed or abandoned innovation projects due to problems accessing external finance is undertaken by 
Mohnen et al. (2008), Tiwari et al. (2007) and Savignac (2008).   
6 The studies by Fazzari et al. (1988) and Whited (1992) for example point to the conclusion that some firms have 
difficulties financing investment externally. 
7  The theoretical investigation by Brei and Schclarek (2015) shows that lending by publicly and privately owned 
banks is reduced during the crisis. 
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II.4 The impact of the financial crisis on expenditures for R&D and investment 
Besides the impact of the financial crisis on banks, which made accessing external capital more 
difficult for firms in general, these problems are particularly prevalent for innovative firms. A 
recent paper by Lee et al. (2015) shows that all firms (innovators and non-innovators) face 
problems accessing external financing. Secondly, Lee et al. (2015) illustrates that a higher share 
of innovators apply for external finance than non-innovators. Moreover, they face more 
difficulties accessing finance.  
In the literature two possible effects of the recent crisis on R&D expenditures for innovative 
firms are suggested. On the one hand firms might increase their R&D spending in the crisis to 
possibly enter new markets or launch new products (Archibugi et al. (2013a, 2013b). On the 
other hand the problems accessing external finance limit the resources for financing R&D and 
this is also observed during the recent financial crisis (Filipetti and Archibugi 2011, Kipar 2011, 
Paunov 2012).8 Furthermore, empirical evidence points to a reduction in investment behavior due 
to financial constraints in the crisis (Campello et al. (2010), Duchin et al. (2010)).9  
II.5 Hypotheses 
Risk in general will be of higher relevance for innovative firms, as investment frequently aims at 
producing newly developed products, as well as the fact that success at market is quite uncertain. 
Investment also serves the purpose of realizing process innovations and, aside of lower marginal 
costs, a new technology will imply technological risks and high fixed costs. If banks must limit 
their lending, they may well reduce the supply of capital to finance the investment of innovative 
firms. Our particular research question is the impact of the crisis on the investment behavior of 
innovative firms. In this regard the theoretical considerations and the empirical results lead us to 
the following hypothesis: 
                                                            
8  Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) find that larger and more R&D-intensive firms likelier reduced their innovation 
investments because of the crisis. Paunov (2012) shows that innovative projects are more frequently stopped due to 
the crisis by young firms. Public funding instead leads to a reduction in the likelihood of discontinuing an innovation 
project. Based on the hypothesis that cooperative banking institutions did not suffer from the financial crisis, Kipar 
(2011) finds that business partners from such banks report less frequently of credit constraints and stop fewer 
ongoing innovation projects. 
9 Comparing constrained and unconstrained firms, Campello et al. (2010) present empirical evidence that constrained 
firms are more likely to reduce investments and technology expenditures because of the crisis. Duchin et al. (2010) 
shows that investments decline due to the crisis. They find in particular, that firms are hit the most if they have either 
low cash reserves, are financially constrained or have their main field of operation in industries which rely heavily on 
external financing. 
8 
 
Hypothesis 1: Compared with non-innovators, product-innovative firms are more likely to 
suffer from worsening financial market conditions with respect to access to 
finance in the recent crisis. In consequence, innovative firms are more likely to 
react with a reduction in investment. 
This hypothesis will be tested by means of data from a questionnaire. This allows us to determine 
the likelihood of a reduction in investment for innovative firms. Aside of analyzing the 
development of investment in general we also investigate whether the change is due to increased 
problems accessing external finance.  
The second hypothesis aims at a test based on firm data. Here information on changes in sales 
over time is compared with changes in investment. Revenues are considered in order to take 
account of the development of the economic environment. Investment by innovators might 
decline more strongly than investment by non-innovators, even if the business conditions in terms 
of demand (reduction) are comparable to the external and internal conditions of non-innovators. 
This leads us to our second research hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Both innovative and non-innovative firms are likely to face a similar fall in 
demand. This will probably lead to an increased need for external financing for 
both firm types. Despite a similar reduction in sales, productive innovative 
firms reduce investment to a larger extent than their non-product innovative 
counterparts.  
III. Data  
This study uses the IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2006 -2010. Data access was provided via 
remote data access. The IAB Establishment Panel covers about 16,000 firms, which are surveyed 
yearly. The IAB panel has been collecting observations from West German establishments since 
1993 and East German ones since 1996. The main emphasis of the panel is on labor demand and 
firm-specific determinants of employment. However, in addition to these topics other interesting 
information on innovation and investment is also collected. On an irregular basis special 
questions are added to the survey that focus, for example, on the financial crisis and its effects on 
these firms.  
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IV. Test for limited access to financing means due to the crisis 
To test the hypotheses stated above, we need to identify the innovative firms first. Hypothesis 1 
requires us to test whether these firms are more frequently affected by the financial crisis. 
Furthermore, we have to determine whether these firms have greater problems accessing external 
finance. To do so, it is necessary to construct variables that reflect the impact of the financial 
crisis on firms. For a test of hypothesis 2, we must separately identify the development of 
revenues and investment over time for innovative and non-innovative firms.  
IV.1 Identification of innovative firms 
Innovativeness is defined as the introduction of a product new to the market (not just new to the 
firm). Such firms are likely to bear considerable risk and to be affected by financial constraints as 
a result. For identification we use the following question from 2007: “Have you started to offer a 
completely new product or service within the last two years for which a new market had to be 
created?” with the possible answers: “Yes” and “No”. From this question we are able to construct 
a variable ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ which takes unit value if the firm introduced a product innovation in the 
years 2005 or 2006 and zero if not. We use this question from 2007 because the covered years 
2005 and 2006 were the last ones before the crisis broke.  
We control for differences in industries with respect to innovation activity and sales by using 
industry dummies. We deal with the issue that the firms could have carried out a service 
innovation instead of a product innovation by only using observations from the manufacturing 
sector. 
IV.2 Financial crisis and financing restrictions  
As mentioned earlier, we use two strategies to identify the impact of the financial crisis on 
innovative firms: analysis of survey data and difference-in-differences estimations based on 
economic data. With respect to direct information from the survey 2010 concerning the impact of 
the crisis, the firms were firstly asked whether they are affected by the crisis at all: “In retrospect: 
did the economic and financial crisis of the past two years affect your establishment/office? This 
question refers to both negative and positive effects.” with the following options: “Yes”, “No”, or 
“Hard to say”. The constructed variable ܣ݂݂݁ܿݐ݁݀	ܾݕ	ݐ݄݁	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ assumes value one if the firm 
was impacted by the crisis and zero if not. In a second step the firms which were affected by the 
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crisis were asked how they were affected: “Were the effects on your establishment/office mainly 
negative, mainly positive or both equally?” We create a variable 
ܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݈݁ݕ	݂݂ܽ݁ܿݐ݁݀	ܾݕ	ݐ݄݁	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ from both questions which takes unit value if the firm was 
impacted mainly negatively by the crisis.  
Next, we analyze the impact of the crisis on financing. First, the firms were asked whether they 
modified their investment plans: “Did you modify your investment plans in the fiscal year 2009 
compared to the original plans? Or were no investments intended anyway?” This question is the 
basis for the upcoming questions concerning the crisis and the financing of investments. Second, 
it is possible to investigate whether the changes in investment plans are due to the financial crisis: 
“Were these modifications made as a result of the financial and economic crisis?” with “Yes” and 
“No” as possible answers. Firms which answered with “Yes” were probably hit by the crisis but 
up to this point it is unclear in which way the firms changed their plans.  
Furthermore, we are able to use information on changes to investment planning by including a 
third question: “Which modifications were made?” The options for answering were “We put 
planned investments on hold or reduced them”, “We increased the investment volume” or “Other 
modifications”. The variable ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ݎ݁݀ݑܿ݁݀	݀ݑ݁	ݐ݋	ݐ݄݁	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ is specified which takes 
the value 1 if the firm modified the investment plans due to the crisis and the modification was a 
reduction to investments.   
Finally, those firms which reduced their investments could state whether this change was caused 
by problems in accessing external capital: “Did you have to overcome difficulties in acquiring 
loan capital from private credit institutions resulting in a deferment or reduction of the planned 
investments?”. The possible answers are simply “Yes” and “No”. The answer “Yes” is a clear 
indicator for problems in accessing external finance. Thus, the question directly aims at the 
impact of the financial crisis on the firms. Due to the direct measure it is possible to identify 
firms which suffered from problems accessing external finance directly and as a consequence 
were forced to reduce investments. The variable ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ݎ݁݀ݑܿ݁݀	݀ݑ݁	ݐ݋	ݐ݄݁	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ	ܽ݊݀	 
ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅݊	݌ݎ݋ܾ݈݁݉ݏ	݅݊	ܽܿܿ݁ݏݏ݅݊݃	݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ assumes unit value if the firm replied in the 
affirmative. 
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IV.3 Estimation strategy to identify financing restrictions for innovative firms 
We use Probit regressions to test hypothesis 1. In particular, we test whether innovative firms are 
more often impacted by the crisis and furthermore how. Moreover, we are able to control for 
other factors which could determine the results besides of being innovative or not.  
The first specification allows testing whether generally innovative firms are affected by the 
financial crisis to a larger degree and whether they are affected negatively. The specification is as 
follows: 
ܣ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൅ ߛ ∗ ௜ܺ ൅	ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ ൅ ߝ௜                  (1) 
Where ܣ௜ covers the outcomes for being affected as described above and is ܣ݂݂݁ܿݐ݁݀	 in	one	
specification	 and	 ܣ݂݂݁ܿݐ݁݀ܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݈݁ݕ	 in	 the	 other.	 ௜ܺ covers the following variables: 
ܨ݋ݑ݊݀݁݀97 െ 07௜ is a dummy variable which assumes unit value if a firm was founded between 
1997 and 2007 and is otherwise zero. Younger firms are assumed to have greater problems with 
respect to financing than older firms. The variable 	lnሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻ௜	 is the logarithmic value of 
employment of firm ݅ and controls for size effects. It is to be expected that larger firms are 
affected less by the crisis and have fewer problems with access to external financing. The 
variable lnሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻ௜ଶ additionally controls for a non-linear relationship with respect to the 
logarithmic value of a firm’s employment. We control for possible effects of a firm’s location in 
the eastern and western parts of Germany. Different effects could arise from the subsidization of 
firms in eastern Germany. To do so, we include the dummy variable ܧܽݏݐܩ݁ݎ݉ܽ݊ݕ௜ which 
assumes unit value in the case of firms which are located in the eastern part of Germany and zero 
otherwise. To take account of participation in international trade we include a dummy 
ܣܿݐ݅ݒ݁ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ݁ݎ௜ which takes unit value if the firm exports goods and zero otherwise. To control 
for differences across industries we include a set of industry dummies ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜. 
A second specification tests whether there are significant differences between treated firms and 
control observations with respect to changes to investment plans. These alterations in turn may be 
caused by the financial crisis and because of problems in acquiring external financing. The 
question was asked in both questionnaires 2009 and 2010 and therefore we use a pooled Probit 
regression for the two years, including a time dummy and an interaction variable. The 
specification looks like this: 
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ܫ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2009௜ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܰ݋݊ െ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2010௜  
    ൅	ߚଷ ∗ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2010௜ ൅ ߛ ∗ ௜ܺ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ ൅ ߝ௜	                           (2) 
 
Where ܫ௜ covers the outcomes concerning the way establishments were affected with respect to 
investments constructed above: ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ݎ݁݀ݑܿ݁݀	݀ݑ݁	ݐ݋	ݐ݄݁	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ	and	 ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ						
ݎ݁݀ݑܿ݁݀	݀ݑ݁	ݐ݋	ݐ݄݁	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ	ܽ݊݀	݌ݎ݋ܾ݈݁݉ݏ	݅݊	ܽܿܿ݁ݏݏ݅݊݃	݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ.	 Since the question 
was asked in two years, we include the interaction variables ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2009௜,		
ܰ݋݊ െ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2010௜ and ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2010௜ to cover the reactions of the non-
innovative and innovative firms in both years 2009 and 2010. The reference category is non-
innovative firms in 2009. ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2009௜  captures investment reactions of innovative firms 
concerning investments in the year 2009 in comparison to non-innovative firms in 2009. The two 
interaction variables covering the behavior of non-innovative and innovative firms in 2010 are 
ܰ݋݊ െ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2010௜ and ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ 2010௜. This procedure is applied to identify 
time-specific differences with respect to innovative and non-innovative firms. Moreover, the 
specification determines whether the effect of the crisis on investments was the same in 2009 and 
2010, or alternatively tests whether the crisis abated or was over in 2010. 
IV.4 Probit regression results  
Descriptive statistics for the variables described above are given in Table 1 for innovators and 
non-innovators. Innovators compared to non-innovators are on average more often negatively 
affected by the crisis. Moreover, they more often report reduced investments due to the crisis and 
limited access to external financing in the crisis. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for innovators and non-innovators 
Variable 
Innovators Non-Innovators 
N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Affected by the crisis 483 0.781 0.414 0 1 1736 0.670 0.470 0 1
Negatively affected by the 
crisis 
458 0.769 0.422 0 1 1649 0.653 0.476 0 1
Investment reduction due to 
the crisis 351 0.835
0.372 0 1 837 0.778 0.416 0 1
Investment reduction due to 
the crisis and therein 
problems in accessing 
external finance 
107 0.458 0.501 0 1 303 0.386 0.488 0 1
Founded between 1997 and 
2007 
697 0.113 0.317 0 1 2247 0.149 0.356 0 1
Size 697 827.311 4129.997 2 49221 2247 192.472 635.700 1 15091
Located in eastern Germany 697 0.463 0.499 0 1 2247 0.511 0.500 0 1
Active exporter 697 0.782 0.413 0 1 2247 0.523 0.500 0 1
Results for the Probit regressions are given in Table 2.10 The results presented in column (1) 
show that the coefficient of the variable ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ	is significant and positive. This suggests that 
innovative firms are more severely affected by the crisis than others. If geographical location and 
exporting behavior (columns (2) and (3)) are controlled for, the effect remains significant. Firms 
located in the eastern part of Germany suffer less from the crisis. In contrast, exporting increases 
the likelihood of being hit by the crisis. Apparently exporting does not “insure” firms against the 
consequences of the financial crisis: on the contrary, the multi-market contacts intensify them.  
In the next step the direction of the impact of the crisis is investigated. Columns (4) to (6) show 
that ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ	is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Therefore, as expected, 
innovative firms are negatively affected by the crisis. Being located in eastern Germany and the 
logarithm of the variable size have similar effects as in columns (2) and (3). The coefficient 
showing the effect of being located in eastern Germany is now significant at least at the 5 percent 
level. Moreover, the results for the remaining control variables are close to the ones reported in 
columns (1) to (3).  
                                                            
10 Marginal effects are calculated following the suggestion made by Puhani (2012) for non-linear models. 
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Table 2: Estimation results for the variables describing impact by the crisis 
Variable 
Affected by the crisis Negatively affected by the crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Innovator 0.050
(0.022)
** 0.052
(0.022)
** 0.044
(0.022)
** 0.054
(0.023)
** 0.056
(0.023)
** 0.048
(0.023)
** 
Founded between 1997 and 
2007 
-0.022
(0.030)
 -0.021
(0.030)
 -0.023
(0.030)
 -0.032
(0.034)
 -0.031
(0.034)
 -0.033
(0.033)
 
ln	ሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻ 0.064
(0.015)
*** 0.064
(0.015)
*** 0.039
(0.014)
*** 0.064
(0.015)
*** 0.064
(0.016)
*** 0.039
(0.014)
***
lnሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻଶ -0.003
(0.001)
* -0.003
(0.001)
** -0.002
(0.001)
 -0.003
(0.002)
* -0.003
(0.002)
** -0.002
(0.001)
 
Located in eastern Germany  -0.029
(0.013)
** -0.024
(0.013)
*  -0.033
(0.013)
*** -0.028
(0.013)
** 
Active exporter  0.116
(0.024)
***  0.113
(0.024)
***
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2219 2219 2219 2107 2107 2107 
Pseudo-ܴଶ 0.100 0.101 0.110 0.103 0.105 0.113 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the industry level. * significant at the 10% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
A more detailed picture with respect to the influence of the crisis is given by the results presented 
in Table 3.11 The first and second columns show the basic results for the outcome variable 
ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ݎ݁݀ݑܿ݁݀	݀ݑ݁	ݐ݋	ݐ݄݁	ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ. This variable takes unit value if the firms changed 
their investment plans by reducing their investment due to the crisis and zero if no change took 
place. Firstly, the interaction ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2009 indicating innovative firms in 2009 is positive 
and significant. This implies that these firms, compared to non-innovative firms in 2009, are 
more likely to be affected by the crisis and reduce their investments. Similarly to most of the 
literature, we observe effects for young firms and size, but in our case they are not significant 
(except the coefficient of ln	ሺܵܫܼܧሻଶ in columns (1) to (3)). Controlling for geographical location 
and exporting behavior does not alter the size of the coefficient of ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2009 much and 
it remains significant. The interaction ܰ݋݊ െ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2010 is negative and significant at 
the 1 percent level, which expresses that the reduction due to the crisis is less pronounced in 2010 
compared to 2009 for the non-innovative firms. Additionally, the interaction term  
ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2010 is also negative (and significant). This indicates that the innovative firms less 
frequently report investment reductions due to the crisis in 2010 compared to non-innovative 
firms in 2009.  
                                                            
11 Marginal effects are calculated following the suggestion made by Puhani (2012) for non-linear models. 
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In columns (4) to (6), the results reflect the presence of problems in accessing external finance 
which led to reductions in investment in the crisis. Again, the coefficient for Innovator ൈ 2009 
is positive and significant at least at the 10 percent level. Hence, the innovative firms are affected 
more frequently by problems with respect to external capital and therefore reduce their 
investments compared to the non-innovators in 2009. Size coefficients in column (4) show the 
expected signs. Again, in columns (4) to (6), the interactions ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2010	and ܰ݋݊ െ
ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2010 are negative and significant. This shows that product-innovative firms are 
less likely to report that they reduced their investments due to problems in acquiring external 
capital in the crisis in 2010 compared to 2009. Moreover the non-innovators are less likely to 
reduce their investments because of problems in acquiring external capital in 2010 compared to 
2009. 
Summing up we observe that the innovative firms are more likely to be affected by the crisis in 
general and that this impact is a negative one. Taking a closer look at the effects it turns out that 
the innovative firms reduced their investments. Moreover, the reduction in investments appears to 
be caused by problems accessing external finance.   
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Table 3: Estimation results for the investment behavior 
Variable 
 
Investment reduction due to the crisis
 
Investment reduction due to the crisis 
and therein problems in accessing 
external finance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2009 0.091
(0.036)
** 0.090
(0.036)
** 0.088
(0.036)
** 0.182
(0.083)
** 0.169
(0.086)
** 0.168
(0.086)
* 
ܰ݋݊ െ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2010 -0.171
(0.033)
*** -0.171
(0.033)
*** -0.172
(0.032)
*** -0.237
(0.041)
*** -0.239
(0.042)
*** -0.239
(0.042)
***
ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ 2010 -0.204
(0.040)
*** -0.205
(0.040)
*** -0.208
(0.039)
*** -0.234
(0.073)
*** -0.236
(0.074)
*** -0.236
(0.074)
***
Founded between 1997 and 
2007 
0.040
(0.026)
 0.040
(0.026)
 0.039
(0.026)
 0.101
(0.075)
 0.102
(0.080)
 0.101
(0.078)
 
ln	ሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻ -0.030
(0.029)
 -0.030
(0.029)
 -0.037
(0.026)
 -0.085
(0.054)
 -0.091
(0.053)
* -0.093
(0.055)
* 
lnሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻଶ 0.006
(0.003)
* 0.006
(0.003)
** 0.007
(0.003)
** 0.010
(0.006)
 0.012
(0.006)
* 0.012
(0.007)
* 
Located in eastern Germany  0.005
(0.018)
 0.005
(0.018)
  0.104
(0.050)
** 0.105
(0.051)
** 
Active Exporter  0.022
(0.022)
  0.006
(0.053)
 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1188 1188 1188 410 410 410 
Pseudo-ܴଶ 0.137 0.137 0.138 0.149 0.158 0.158 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the industry level. Significance. Significance: * significant 
at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
V. Comparison of revenue and investment growth 
V.1 Empirical methodology 
To investigate hypothesis 2, we estimate a difference-in-differences equation. Innovative firms in 
our context are the treatment observations. ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ assumes unit value in the case of firms 
which introduced a novelty to the market during the two years prior to 2007 and takes value zero 
for those firms which did not. The firms which introduced a novelty to the market  
(ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൌ 1) form our treatment group of firms. Those firms which did not carry out a 
product innovation are used as the control group. 
The log change of revenues as growth rate of revenue is one of the dependent variables. Our 
intention is as follows: revenues reflect to what extent a firm is hit by the crisis due to reduced 
demand. In addition, sales represent the inflow of financial resources. Since we have no further 
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information about the firms’ internal financing resources, we take revenues as a proxy for the 
availability of internal means to finance investments.12  
In the next step investment behavior over time is considered. We use the yearly log change in 
investments as the growth rate of investments. The line of reasoning with respect to hypothesis 2 
is as follows: the economic downturn due to the financial crisis is likely to affect revenues of all 
firms. If the revenue of firms decreases it is in turn also probable that the firms’ internal means to 
finance investments in physical assets will decrease. On the one hand, firms will to some degree 
reduce investment in general and on the other hand they will try to substitute the lacking internal 
financial resources with external funding. Section IV points to the conclusion that innovative 
firms have more difficulty receiving external funding. Then, even with a similar reduction in 
revenues, investment of the innovative firms will fall to a greater extent than investment by the 
non-innovative firms.  
Next, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. The DID estimator compares both groups 
with each other before and after the crisis and would look like this: 
߬஽ூ஽ ൌ ሾܧሾܫܴ௜|ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൌ 1, ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ ൌ 1ሿ െ ܧሾܫܴ௜|ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൌ 1, ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ ൌ 0ሿሿ 
       െ	ሾܧሾܫܴ௜|ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൌ 0, ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ ൌ 1ሿ െ ܧሾܫܴ௜|ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൌ 0, ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ ൌ 0ሿሿ     (3) 
Using the DID approach, we can control on the one hand for common effects like 
macroeconomic conditions and on the other hand for unobserved individual, time-invariant 
effects. We compare the effects on the innovators (our treatment group) with the non-innovators 
(our control group) for the years 2006 and 2009. Our difference-in-differences estimation is as 
follows: 
ܫܴ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൅ ߬஽ூ஽ ∗ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ  
        ൅	ߛ ∗ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ ൅ ߝ௜                           (4) 
We observe two outcomes which are described by ܫܴ௜௧	 i.e. ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄	and	
ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁	݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄. The variable ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ reflects the time effect and takes unit value if the time 
period after 2008/2009 is considered. We take the period 2008 as the start of the crisis due to the 
                                                            
12 Hall et al. (1999) for instance show that sales lead to investment in physical assets and also investment in R&D. 
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fact that the banks were already experiencing their first problems in late 2007.13 The interaction 
ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൈ ܱܲܵ ௜ܶ identifies the treatment effect in the above regression framework.  
V.2 Difference-in-differences results 
This section presents the difference-in-differences results. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics 
for the sample of firms observed in the years 2006 and 2009. We use 523 control firms and 217 
treatment firms. About 10 percent of the control firms are younger than 10 years and the mean 
size is about 254 in both periods. About half of the control firms are located in the east and about 
two thirds are active exporters before and in the crisis. The treatment firms show almost similar 
values concerning age and location. Differences exist with respect to exporting behavior and firm 
size. Treatment firms export to a larger percentage and are on average larger. Both groups face a 
reduction in revenue and investment growth from the pre-crisis to the crisis period.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for treatment and control group 
Variable 
Innovators Non-Innovators 
N Pre-crisis Crisis N Pre-crisis Crisis 
Revenue growth 217 0.082 -0.165 523 0.103 -0.136
Investment growth 217 0.256 -0.416 523 0.114 -0.268
Founded between 1997 and 2007 217 0.092 0.092 523 0.105 0.105
Size 217 773.018 797.600 523 254.918 254.478
Located in eastern Germany 217 0.493 0.488 523 0.482 0.482
Active exporter 217 0.783 0.811 523 0.639 0.654
 
The results of the difference-in-differences estimations are presented in Table 5. We add several 
covariates and correct the standard errors according to the suggestion of Donald and Lang (2007) 
and Bertrand et al. (2004) by clustering at the industry level. The difference-in-differences 
estimates for the revenue growth are given in columns (1) to (3). Column (1) shows the estimate 
without controlling for anything other than industry affiliation. The coefficient of the interaction 
is negative and insignificant at conventional levels. In column (2), we present results with added 
covariates for age, size, geographical location and exporting behavior. These modifications do 
not affect the coefficient of the interaction variable with respect to its size and significance. 
Solely the coefficient of the variable indicating active exporters in column (2) is significant at the 
                                                            
13 We follow works like Kipar (2011) and Puri et al. (2011). 
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1 percent level. The results using firm fixed effects are shown in column (3). The coefficient of 
the interaction term changes slightly.  
The difference-in-differences estimates support the first part of our hypothesis 2, which states 
that the crisis is expected to have similar effects on the revenues of both groups. The second part 
of Table 5 shows the outcome concerning investment growth. The results of the difference-in-
differences estimations presented in column (4) show that compared to the non-innovators the 
innovators realize a significantly larger reduction in growth rates of investment. Column (5) 
displays the results of estimations with additional covariates. The picture remains essentially 
unchanged. According to these results the treated firms suffered much more from the crisis with 
respect to investment growth than the firms of the control group. The specification with firm 
fixed effects in column (6) shows a slightly decreased coefficient for the interaction term which 
remains significant at the 5 percent level.  
Moreover, the results also remain similar if the variable size and/or age are specified differently. 
Restricting the sample to small firms equally leads to unaltered results. For hypothesis 2 to be 
confirmed we would need to estimate an insignificant difference-in-differences estimate for the 
revenue growth equation and a significant coefficient for the investment growth equation. This is 
exactly what we observe.  
 
 
 
 
  
20 
 
Table 5: Estimation results for the investment behavior 
Variable 
Revenue growth  Investment growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ -0.016
(0.012)
 -0.007
(0.012)
  0.141
(0.092)
 0.150
(0.089)
  
ܱܲܵܶ -0.239
(0.042)
***  -0.238
(0.042)
*** -0.237
(0.059)
*** -0.382
(0.081)
*** -0.382
(0.080)
*** -0.380
(0.116)
***
ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݋ݎ ൈ ܱܲܵܶ -0.008
(0.026)
 -0.008
(0.026)
 -0.016
(0.036)
 -0.290
(0.095)
*** -0.289
(0.095)
*** -0.288
(0.126)
** 
Founded between 1997 and 
2007 
 0.031
(0.023)
    0.106 
(0.129)
  
ln	ሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻ  0.017
(0.028)
 0.201
(0.461)
  -0.036
(0.139)
 0.961
(1.414)
 
lnሺܵ݅ݖ݁ሻଶ  -0.003
(0.003)
 0.005
(0.045)
  0.002
(0.015)
 -0.134
(0.148)
 
Located in eastern 
Germany 
 0.004
(0.013)
   0.042
(0.085)
  
Active exporter  -0.028
(0.008)
*** 0.032
(0.049)
  -0.013
(0.074)
-0.020
(0.261)
 
Constant 0.135
(0.021)
***  0.122
(0.075)
 -0.955
(1.253)
 0.234
(0.042)
*** 0.317
(0.311)
-1.127
(3.318)
 
Firm fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
N 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 
ܴଶ 0.236 0.246 0.599 0.055 0.057 0.508 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the industry level. Significance. Significance: * significant 
at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
VI. Conclusion 
The impact of the financial crisis on banks is well known and frequently discussed. Because of 
the negative impact on banks and the associated restrictions for banks with respect to lending, it 
is likely that the financial crisis also had an impact on the real economy. Investment as an 
important source for growth, competitiveness of firms and welfare enhancement for consumers 
might be reduced. Our emphasis is the differentiation between innovating and non-innovating 
firms as there are theoretical arguments as to why innovative firms are more severely hit by the 
financial crisis.  
To investigate this question we analyze on the one hand survey data, using information from the 
firms themselves to investigate how they evaluate the impact of the crisis. Firstly, innovative 
firms are generally more likely to be negatively affected by the crisis. Secondly, innovative firms 
more frequently reduce their investments due to the crisis. Hence, we find empirical support for 
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our first hypothesis. According to our results innovative firms are more likely to be constrained 
with respect to financing their investment activities compared to non-innovative firms. These 
constraints lead innovative firms to reduce their investment activities. 
Next, we use difference-in-differences estimations to determine the reasons for reduced 
investment during the crisis. We investigate the changes in growth rates of sales and investment. 
Sales are applied to investigate whether the crisis affected demand for output (and probably the 
availability of internal financial resources) of the innovative and non-innovative firms in the same 
way or differently. Difference-in-differences estimates point to the conclusion that the growth of 
revenues developed similarly for innovators and non-innovators. However, the impact of the 
crisis on investment by innovative firms is much stronger than on investment by other firms. 
Hence, while the impact during the crisis of the market on revenues is similar for both firm types, 
investment behavior is not. Innovative firms show much larger fluctuations in investment growth. 
Combining these results from the difference-in-differences estimations with the Probit 
estimations of the survey response, we conclude that the serious problems accessing external 
financing by innovative firms explains our observations.   
An analysis of investment in physical assets is also of interest because they are correlated with 
R&D investments (Chiao 2001, 2002). It is likely that the R&D investments of innovative firms 
also decreased significantly compared to the control firms due to the crisis. This hypothesis will 
be considered in more detail in the future. 
Summarizing, innovative firms were hit more severely by the financial crisis, had more problems 
than others in accessing external finance and this had an impact on their expenditures for 
investment. Given the importance of investment for the implementation of the outcome of 
innovative projects and of innovation for the growth of economies one might wonder whether our 
results lead to policy implications. A possible measure would be a countercyclical public funding 
of innovative projects. In particular, if an economy suffers a very severe recession, additional 
help for innovators might be justifiable in order to substitute for the reduction in private 
financing. However for such a recommendation more research is needed. 
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